There is an argument I have heard. It goes like this: “Words have meanings.” The implication is that one cannot just use words to mean whatever they want, the words have defined meanings and these definitions are the only things those words can mean. I have seen this argument used a variety of contexts, from complaining about the use of the word “literally” as an intensifier to objecting to the use of the word “woman” to include trans women. In cases like the former, the word’s use is generally regarded as an ignorant mistake. In cases like the latter, especially among some groups of people, there may be an accusation of Orwellian Newspeak.

The argument is fundamentally incorrect, though. Words don’t have meanings, words have usage. Words do mean things when they are used: in a particular conversation, for example, we could examine what a person meant by a specific word. The key is that meaning always occurs within a context. English, and other natural languages, do not have context-free grammar. It is not possible to write down a list of rules that accurately describe how words can be used. Grammar books and dictionaries are descriptive tools; they provide an incomplete picture of the most common patterns of usage we have identified. It is simply not linguistically possible for a dictionary to be prescriptive. A language whose words can be defined in a book is not English.

The real issue with meaning is the possibility for miscommunication. If one uses a word in a highly unusual way, their intended meaning may not be understood by the listener. This presents us with a good reason for using dictionaries: in order to understand what people usually mean when they use a word, both so that we can understand what someone is likely talking about in some particular situation and so that we can use the word in a way that is likely to be understood by others. There are a couple reasons why concerns about possible miscommunication do not apply to the “words have meanings” argument as in the examples I described.

First, I don’t think I have ever encountered a situation (either firsthand or hearing about it happening to someone) wherein a person genuinely misunderstood what was being said because of the use of the word “literally” as an intensifier. I don’t deny that it can happen, but I do assert that it is exceedingly rare. Context almost always makes it clear what is being said. Consider the following examples:

“He literally turned blue.”

“This is literally the best nectarine I have ever tasted.”

“I am literally never going outside again.”

These examples are even devoid of context, but we can still make some inferences. In the first example, “literally” seems to be being used literally. In the third example, “literally” seems to be being used figuratively. In the second example, there is more ambiguity, but consider a similar sentence, “This is the best nectarine I have ever tasted.” This sentence is also ambiguous between a literal statement of fact and hyperbole; you’d need to know the person and/or the wider context in which the sentence appears in order to make a determination. There is also not much difference a statement of fact and hyperbole in this situation. People don’t generally remember the best instance of every individual food item they have ever tasted. Even if someone is speaking literally, it is likely that the underlying meaning is still simply “this is an exceptionally good nectarine.” Moreover, using “literally” as an intensifier or to create hyperbole is a common and therefore normal usage of the word. Compare some of the other intensifiers in English: “very,” and “really,” which are derived from the Latin words verus (true) and realis (actual). The fact is, uncomfortable as it might be to some, English has always made intensifiers by saying something is literally, truthfully, actually the case when it is not. This is a straightforward example of hyperbole. Nowadays we also use words like “legitimately” or “legit.” This is how language has always been.

The second reason why miscommunication is not a real issue is because miscommunication happens all the time. It happens even when people use words according to their dictionary definitions. We typically don’t notice because dealing with miscommunication is built into language. We use redundancy (saying the same thing in two different ways), we use questions to check for understand and to ask for clarification, and, very importantly, we just go about our lives in spite of misunderstandings. We only sometimes detect our own misunderstanding (or someone else’s), especially if the misunderstanding is minor and both interpretations of meaning make sense within the context. Language is messy and imperfect. It’s not logically consistent. It simply doesn’t make sense to focus on potential confusion regarding a word like “literally” when English is rife with vagueness and ambiguity.

Another issue with the “words have meanings” perspective is that it attempts to draw a clear separation between the literal and the figurative. Virtually no one objects to irregular word use in poetry or in a highly metaphorical piece of prose, but some people have the idea that everyday language use is fundamentally not the same. In reality, everyday language is highly figurative. This is both a source of ambiguity and an enormous strength. Languages that are strictly defined, like a programming language, trade off increased specificity for decreased expressive power. There is a general principle that the less ambiguous a language is, the less flexible and expressive it is.

All that said, there is a phenomenon in which a person claims a word means something when they really mean something else by it. This can occur in a variety of ways: euphemism, double entendre, dog whistles, white lies, and so on. This is more akin to doublespeak, a word from George Orwell’s fictional Newspeak, rather than Newspeak itself.

Newspeak: a purposefully ambiguous and confusing language with restricted grammar and limited vocabulary used in Oceania, according or Orwell, “to diminish the range of thought.” For example, in newspeak, the term plusgood had replaced words better and great.

Center for the Arts at George Mason University

As with many things related to 1984, attempts to draw parallels to current events usually mischaracterizes the novel.

Let’s consider the controversial issue of using the word “woman” in a way that includes trans women. The accusation is that people who say “trans women are women” are consciously lying, or engaging in doublethink. They know, supposedly, that the statement is not actually true, but are saying it anyway as a kind of propaganda. In general, I don’t believe this is the case. Instead, “trans women are women” is an actual assertion that one category includes the other, just like “American women are women” or “tall women are women” or “elderly women are women.” As a matter of speculation, I think it is inconceivable to certain individuals that anyone could genuinely believe this to be the case (and thus anyone who says so must be lying to them). It is indeed a statement about what trans women are and what women are, but it is not a redefinition of the word “woman,” which has never ever had a strict, unambiguous definition. In fact, biology and physiology preclude the possibility even of the term “female” having an unambiguous definition, since both sex and gender are complex, high-level abstract concepts and not individual behaviors or morphological features, which could be more concretely defined. In other words, for example, having certain chromosomes is a pretty unambiguous physical feature, but chromosomes don’t line up with how “woman” is actually used (even by a very traditional conservative). Similarly, having sexual intercourse with certain individuals is a pretty unambiguous behavior, but this doesn’t line up with how “sexual orientation” is used; and so on regarding virtually all the ways we might want to describe a person. (See also my post An analysis of biological arguments against transgenderism.)